Lecture 2

Derrida's Lecture and Foucault's Programme

Derrida's lecture

Date: 1968 (Vietnam War)
Title: 'The Ends of Man'
Theme: 'Humanism' in French philosophy since 1945


1. Metaphysical humanism

At the time (post-1945) when Husserl's phenomenology became the dominant style of
philosophy in France, the anti-humanist implications of Husserl's critique of psychologism
were not appreciated.
Instead –

Misreading of Heidegger: e.g. translation of Dasein ('human reality')
        (But there is a real issue here)
Sartre's humanism
        (but Derrida misrepresents Sartre)
Misreading of Hegel as if it's an account of the development and structure of human reason;
when in fact it's 'Geist' that matters, and 'Geist' transcends humanity.
        (Yes – but ...)
Misreading of Marx, as if the 1844 manscripts and their emphasis on the 'alienation' of man
were his key thoughts, instead of the later 'scientific' critique of capitalism.
        (But what of Lukacs' 'marxist humanism'?)


2. Humanism reconstrued

Aufhebung/Relève/'sublation', 'transcendence'
Hegel: consciousness and the 'end' of man
        Teleology and the 'we' of consciousness
Kant: see fn. 15
        'we' in the 'margins of philosophy'
        (But Kant's 'formula of humanity' *Groundwork* 4: 429)
Husserl: 'teleology of reason' affirmed
        But there's much more: H's phenomenology is a phenomenology of the human
subject


3. Heidegger's B&T

Dasein ('the being of Man') as the being which each of us is
Dasein's priority – in raising the question of being
Dasein's other priorities:
        'Dasein possesses – as constitutive for its understanding of existence – an
understanding of the Being of all beings of a character other than its own. Dasein has
therefore ... priority as providing the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any
ontologies.' (B&T p. 34)

........
       'But now it has been shown that the ontological analytic of Dasein in general is what makes up fundamental ontology ......' (B&T p. 35)

## 4. Heidegger's Letter

Humanism as Metaphysics

JD's emphasis:
       proximity (see fn. 35)
       metaphors (e.g. 'Lichtung'/light)
       presence (esp. fn. 36)
       'proper' ( = *eigen* in German: hence
p. 133: 'The proper of man, his *Eigenheit*, his 'authenticity', is to be related to the meaning of Being'

## 5. JD's coda

'Trembling' (cf. later on Kierkegaard)
West/East (Vietnam war)
'End' of man? – or, rather, the end of 'authenticity'?
Deconstruction – as internal and external critique
Nietzsche and metaphysics

Michel Foucault: 1926-1984

1961 Folie et déraison (Madness and Civilisation)
1966 Les mots et les choses (The Order of Things)
1969 Professor at the College de France
1975 Surveiller et punir (Discipline and Punish)
1976 Histoire de la sexualité (History of Sexuality)
From c. 1975, MF was a frequent visitor to Berkeley
Brief guide: see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/

1. Brief background

French history and philosophy of science (Koyré)
Canguilheim, Bachelard - 'Ruptures' (Kuhn)

Sartre ('Le dernier philosophe')
Merleau-Ponty & the phenomenology of mental illness

2. Archaeology

Phenomenology and 'sedimentation'
Discourses
'Knowledge' ('Episteme')
Practices and the 'constitution' of kinds

3. Periods

Renaissance
Classical (Descartes)
Modern (Kant)
Postmodern? (? Nietzsche)

4. Madness

Renaissance – 'fool'
(Erasmus 'In Praise of folly')
Classical period – 'mad' (Descartes)
'The great exclusion'/'asylums?' (Bedlam)
Modern period – 'insane'/ill
York Retreat/ psychiatry etc
Postmodern?
Anti-psychiatry? (or chlorpromazine? Largactil)

5. Doubts?

Bracton (14th century) and post-natal depression

Locke: *mad Men* 'do not appear to me to have lost the Faculty of Reasoning: but having joined together some *Ideas* very wrongly, they mistake them for Truths.... For by the violence of their Imaginations, having taken their Fancies for Realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus you shall find a distracted Man fancying himself a King, with a right inference, require suitable Attendance, Respect, and Obedience: Others who have thought themselves made of Glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies.' (*Essay* II XI §13).

Jonathan Swift (d. 1745)
  "He left the little wealth he had
   To build a house for fools and mad,
   To show by one satiric touch
   No nation needed it so much."
St Patrick's Asylum, Dublin (1746)

Roy Porter: Madness – A Brief History


6. 'Man' and the 'Human Sciences'

'The constitution of ourselves as subjects of knowledge'
Classical period
        systems of ideas (Descartes, Locke etc.)
Modern period
        question of 'representation' (Kant)
        constitution of 'man' as a subject for science

'Man for the human sciences is not that living being with a very particular form ..... ; he is that living being who, from within the life to which he entirely belongs and by which he is traversed in his entire being, constitutes representations by means of which he lives, and on the basis of which he possesses that strange capacity of being able to represent to himself precisely that life.' (OT p. 352)


7. 'Human Sciences'

Psychology, Sociology, Linguistics -
        conceived as empirical inquiries into conditions of possibility:
'The human sciences are not, then, an analysis of what man is by nature; but rather an analysis that extends from what man is in his positivity (living, speaking, labouring being) to what enables this same being to know (or seek to know) what life is, in what the essence of labour and its laws consist, and in what way he is able to speak.' (OT p. 353) (cf. p. 364 bottom)

8 Science

Archaeology's task: to distinguish (p. 365)
(i) Dead 'opinions' – e.g 'natural magic'
(ii) Living bodies of knowledge:
        (a) sciences – 'objective and systematic'
        (b) positive bodies of knowledge that are not sciences
                e.g. so-called 'human sciences'


9. The end of man?

'Perhaps we should see the first attempt at this uprooting of anthroplogy … in the Nietzschean experience: …Nietzsche rediscovered the point at which man and God belong to one another, at which the death of the second (God) is synonymous with the disappearance of the first.' (OT p. 342)


10. Enlightenment

Enlightenment as 'Modernity'
Modernity as an 'attitude' (p. 309)
Kant: 'dare to know' (p. 306)
Baudelaire: not discovering but inventing oneself (p. 312)
MF: permanent 'critique and creation of ourselves in our autonomy (pp. 314)
Distinguish this from 'humanism' – Heideggerian critique


11 Genealogy

Kant: transcendental critique as marking out the a priori limits of knowledge
MF: 'genealogical critique' as finding the contingent, alterable constraints (pp. 315-6)
      'seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom' (p. 316)
Genealogy as study of 'constitution' of ourselves
      (i) as subjects of knowledge – *The Order of Things*
      (ii) as exercising or submitting to power – *Discipline and Punish*
      (iii) as 'moral' subjects – *The History of Sexuality*

12 Progress?

Against: general theory (p. 316)
For: partial transformations (p. 316)
NB: MF is NOT hostile to the Enlightenment: - his conclusion is that:
'the critical task still entails faith in Enlightenment: I continue to think that this task requires work on our limits, a patient labor giving birth to our impatience for liberty' (p. 319)

13. MF on Sartre

'I think that from the theoretical point of view, Sartre avoids the idea of the self as something which is given to us, but through the moral notion of authenticity, he turns back to the idea that we have to be true to ourselves – to be truly our true self. I think that the only acceptable practical consequence of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical insight to the practice of creativity – and not that of authenticity. From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequences: we have to create ourselves as a work of art.  In his analyses of Baudelaire, Flaubert, and so on, it is interesting to see that Sartre refers the work of creation to a certain relation to oneself – the author to himself – what has the form of authenticity or inauthenticity. I would like to say exactly the contrary: we should not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity.'

'My view is much closer to Nietzsche's than to Sartre's. (p. 262)