This expository book shows how mathematics can help to identify and characterize a disturbingly large number of paradoxical situations that result from the choice of a voting procedure. Moreover, rather than being able to dismiss them as anomalies, the likelihood of a dubious election result is surprisingly large. These consequences indicate that election outcomes—whether for president, the site of the next Olympics, the chair of a university department, or a prize winner—can differ from what the voters really wanted. They show that by using an inadequate voting procedure, we can, inadvertently, choose badly. To add to the difficulties, it turns out that the mathematical structures of voting admit several strategic opportunities, which are described.
Finally, mathematics also helps identify positive results: By using mathematical symmetries, we can identify what the phrase “what the voters really want” might mean and obtain a unique voting method that satisfies these conditions.
Saari’s book should be required reading for anyone who wants to understand not only what happened in the presidential election of 2000, but also how we can avoid similar problems from appearing anytime any group is making a choice using a voting procedure. Reading this book requires little more than high school mathematics and an interest in how the apparently simple situation of voting can lead to surprising paradoxes.
Arrow's famous theorem states that, given some axioms desirable in any voting system, the only voting system that obeys those axioms is a dictatorship. This is a problem: if all the axioms are desirable, how can we resolve the conflict?
The problem is not restricted to elections. Any time we use a decision process to chose an alternative -- say, the most efficient manufacturing process, or the "best" choice of product -- we run into the same problems.
Saari analyses the problem in detail, and makes it clear that one of the axioms (binary independence: that the relative ranking of A and B should be independent of the ranking of C), although apparently reasonable, is the cause of all the problems, and is in fact not at all reasonable in a "sophisticated society". This is because the binary independence requirement loses information about how voters rank candidates in a dangerous way: it allows the possibility of "irrational voters" (those that prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A). Because this loss of information allows silly cases, it cannot enforce sensible cases.
More generally, reducing a problem to parts can lose essential information needed to put those parts back together in the correct way:
Saari also covers other related cases, including Sen's theorem and Simpson's paradox (where aggregating data can reverse the conclusion of the individual parts). It's all about problems arising from losing information. This leads Saari to wonder:
More to the point, this illustrates that the "optimality" of parts cannot be decided in reductionist isolation. Their fitness depends on the context, on which "whole" they form a part.
Another case Saari touches on, where lost information can result in unhappy results, is striving for fairness:
The solution Saari recommends is to use the "Borda count": for n choices, each voter gives them a ranked value from 0 to n-1. The sum of all voters' rankings gives the final ranking. This reintroduces the lost information and ensures voters are "rational" (there is no way to state a cyclic preference in this approach). But it loses binary independence: C's ranking can affect (reverse!) the relative ranking of A and B. However, we have to be educated to realise that this is a necessary consequence of being a "sophisticated" voting society.
Recommended reading for anyone thinking of using or inventing a voting system or decision-making procedure.