Arrow's famous theorem states that, given some axioms desirable in
          any voting system, the only voting system that obeys those axioms is a
          dictatorship. This is a problem: if all the axioms are desirable, how
          can we resolve the conflict?
         p13.
          the winner of an election may more
          accurately reflect the choice of a decision procedure rather than the
          views and preferences of the voters. 
        
        The problem is not restricted to elections. Any time we use a
          decision process to chose an alternative -- say, the most efficient
          manufacturing process, or the "best" choice of product -- we
          run into the same problems.
        
        Saari analyses the problem in detail, and makes it clear that one of
          the axioms (binary independence: that the relative ranking of A and B
          should be independent of the ranking of C), although apparently
          reasonable, is the cause of all the problems, and is in fact not at
          all reasonable in a "sophisticated society". This is because
          the binary independence requirement  loses information about how
          voters rank candidates in a dangerous way:  it allows the possibility
          of "irrational voters" (those that prefer A to B, B to C,
          and C to A). Because this loss of information allows silly cases, it
          cannot enforce sensible cases. 
        
        More generally, reducing a problem to parts can lose essential
          information needed to put those parts back together in the correct
          way:
         pp104-5.
          Expect paradoxical phenomena whenever
          there is a potential discrepancy between the actual unified whole and
          the various ways to interpret the totality of disconnected parts.
          Whenever this is true, whenever the "instruction sheet"
          describing how to connect the parts is dismissed, lost, or ignored,
          expect the unexpected; anticipate bothersome and unexpected outcomes
          to arise in a subtle, unexpected manner.
          
     
 the natural tactic of
          solving a complicated problem by dividing it into "parts."
          This separation may be promoted in the name of "efficiency;"
          it may be rationalized as a means to simplify the analysis. But, this
          division, this decentralization, this approach we have been taught to
          embrace, can be a hidden, pernicious "killer assumption" ...
          
     
 this "assassin
          assumption" of emphasizing the parts forms a natural explanation
          for differences found so often between the micro and macro
          examinations of so many disciplines. After all, the explicit purpose
          of the micro study is to understand the structure of a specified "part"
          of the field as disconnected from the other structures. The micro
          approach is a valued, necessary strategy. But, when attempting to
          understand a macro concern by using information from micro studies,
          the importance of using "connecting information" among the
          micro parts must be acknowledged.
          
     ...
          
This loss of connecting information most definitely occurs in
          general decision making whenever the societal outcomes of "parts"
          has a de facto precedence over the whole. This includes those commonly
          used procedures, such as agendas and tournaments, which reach a final
          conclusion in terms of disjoint decisions about "pairs." ...
        
        
        Saari also covers other related cases, including Sen's theorem and
          Simpson's paradox
          (where aggregating data can reverse the conclusion of the individual
          parts). It's all about problems arising from losing information. This
          leads Saari to wonder:
         p108.
          Could there be settings where the global
          "optimal" outcome requires putting together "suboptimal"
          parts? 
        
        More to the point, this illustrates that the "optimality"
          of parts cannot be decided in reductionist isolation. Their fitness
          depends on the  context, on which "whole" they form a part.
        
        Another case Saari touches on, where lost information can result in
          unhappy results, is striving for fairness:
         p129.
          Insisting on fairness by worrying about
          pairwise comparisons, or comparisons of this group versus that one,
          emphasizes the "parts." 
        
        The solution Saari recommends is to use the "Borda count":
          for  n choices, each voter gives them a ranked value from 0 to
          n-1. The sum of all voters' rankings gives the final ranking.
          This reintroduces the lost information and ensures voters are "rational"
          (there is no way to state a cyclic preference in this approach). But
          it loses binary independence: C's ranking can affect (reverse!) the
          relative ranking of A and B. However, we have to be educated to
          realise that this is a necessary consequence of being a "sophisticated"
          voting society.
         p166.
          the political correctness of pairwise
          comparisons has blinded our thinking about the fundamental traits of
          choice procedures. Even today procedures are criticized if they fail
          the binary independence test. This condition has so colored our
          thinking that, rather than questioning and modifying "binary
          independence." it is more popular to explore what happens by
          tinkering with Arrow's other assumptions. This approach resembles the
          old story of the drunk losing his car keys in the bushes but searching
          for them under a street light where it is easier to see. 
        
        
        Recommended reading for anyone thinking of using or inventing a
          voting system or decision-making procedure.