% Adam's SOAS Anthropology Thesis
%
% Written 2013
% Typeset 2023 (OWD)

\documentclass[twoside]{article}

\usepackage[
  a4paper,
  top = 35mm,
  bottom = 35mm
]{geometry}

\usepackage[bottom]{footmisc}
\usepackage{graphicx, setspace, fancyhdr, lastpage, xcolor, csquotes}

\usepackage[
  backend = biber,
  bibencoding = utf8,
  style = authoryear-icomp
]{biblatex}

\usepackage[
	colorlinks = true,
	allcolors = darkgray 
]{hyperref}

\DeclareDelimFormat[parencite]{postnotedelim}{\addcolon\space}
\DeclareFieldFormat{postnote}{\mknormrange{#1}}
\addbibresource{thesis.bib}
\hfuzz=1.1pt

% Document metadata definitions

\title{Politics of the Body}
\author{Adam Gottesmann}
\date{April 2013}
\newcommand{\subdate}{July 2023}
\newcommand{\subtitle}{An Analysis of the Vedic Ritualization Dichotomy and its
  Contribution to the Study of Power Relations in Theravada Buddhist Polities}
\newcommand{\project}{Independent Study Project}
\newcommand{\department}{Arts and Humanities}
\newcommand{\coursecode}{157400023}
\newcommand{\studentcode}{257395}
\newcommand{\supervisor}{Gustaaf Houtman}
\newcommand{\wordcount}{9858}

% Proportional vertical space
\newcommand{\pvspace}[1]{\vspace*{\stretch{#1}}}

% Hide section numbers in headings, but include in the TOC/PDF index.
\setcounter{secnumdepth}{0}

% Header and footer configuration

\renewcommand{\footrulewidth}{\headrulewidth}

\makeatletter
\fancypagestyle{fancy}{%
  \fancyhf{}
  \fancyhead[LE,RO]{\textsc{\@title}}
  \fancyhead[RE,LO]{\@author}
  \fancyfoot[L]{\@date; \subdate}
  \fancyfoot[R]{Page \thepage~of~\pageref*{LastPage}}
}
\makeatother

% Document body

\begin{document}
  \hypersetup{pageanchor=false}
  \newgeometry{margin=1in}
  \begin{titlepage}
    \begin{center}
      \Large \textit{Independent Study Project}
      \pvspace{.5}

      \makeatletter
      \huge \textbf{\@title}
      \makeatother
      \pvspace{.1}

      \LARGE \subtitle
      \pvspace{1}

      \Large
      \makeatletter
      \begin{tabular}{rl}
        \textit{Department}     & \department  \\
        \textit{Course Code}    & \coursecode  \\
        \textit{Student Number} & \studentcode \\
        \textit{Author}         & \@author     \\
        \textit{Supervisor}     & \supervisor
      \end{tabular}
      \makeatother
      \pvspace{.5}

      \includegraphics[width=.5\linewidth]{logo}
      \pvspace{.5}

      \textbf{\wordcount\ Words}
      \pvspace{.1}

      \makeatletter
      Authored \@date
      \makeatother
      \pvspace{.1}

      Typeset \subdate
    \end{center}
  \end{titlepage}
  \restoregeometry

  \shipout\null
  \stepcounter{page}
  \pagestyle{fancy}
  \hypersetup{pageanchor=true}
  \pagenumbering{arabic}
  \setstretch{1.5}

  \section{Introduction}

  My interest in South and South East Asian Religious Traditions, particularly
  Buddhism and Hinduism began with J.C. Heesterman's \textit{Inner Conflict of
  Tradition} which I encountered while attending an introductory course on
  Hinduism\footnotemark. J.C. Heesterman's approach to social dynamics in
  Pre-modern India seemed to offer me the analytical tools required to address
  the overwhelmingly multifarious data. The following year, while studying
  Theravada Buddhism, I reconsidered Heesterman's approach to South Asia and
  chose to address South East Asian Buddhism in a similar way. The feedback I
  received was positive yet I felt that further analysis was required in order
  to address my increasing skepticism of Heesterman's theories. I took advantage
  of this year's \textit{Religious Philosophies of Ancient and Medieval India
  Course} in order to question further Heesterman's intellectual influences and
  the revisionist interpretation of his analysis. At a certain point in my
  research I realized that the symbolism of the body played a crucial role in
  conceptualizing social dynamics in Pre-modern Indian traditions and I chose to
  deal with this topic in a separate paper. Thus, this paper serves, in many
  ways, as a synthesis of my learning process throughout my studies. The courses
  I have taken and the papers I have written have collectively served to
  strengthen my understanding of South and South East Asian Religious Traditions
  and have enabled me to write this thesis. I would like to thank in particular
  my essay advisor Gustaaf Houtman for guiding me through the dark alleys of
  uncertainty by providing me with significant tools of insight and encouraging
  feedback. I would also like to thank \emph{OWD} for his continuous and
  exceedingly generous dispensation of typographical wisdom.

  \footnotetext{See \autocite{Heesterman:1985}.}

  This paper starts off by focusing on the theme of freedom and individuality in
  metaphysical societies. After discussing some cross-cultural parallels in the
  construction of the individual, a more critical analysis of theoretical
  constructs concerning the individual will be provided in the context of
  Ancient Indian power relations. In order to illustrate to what extent Indology
  is relevant to our analysis of power relations, an assessment of the evidence
  concerning the birth of renunciation and asceticism will also be offered.
  Subsequently, the correlation between the individual and the ascetic will be
  explored in order to investigate to what extent symbolisms of the body may be
  chimed with notions of power and liberation. Having identified a revisionist
  model of a power/knowledge matrix that is heavily connected to symbols of the
  body in Pre-modern India, such theoretical constructs will be applied in the
  Southeast Asian Buddhist context. In order to justify such theoretical
  applications I will illustrate some parallels observed by scholars such as Ian
  Harris and Stanley Tambiah between the two evidently distinct geographical
  regions. Particular methodological incongruities such as the differentiation
  between Buddhist meditator and ascetic; Buddhism and \textit{\'s\=asana}; the
  laity and the monastics; and myth and factuality will be analyzed and
  hopefully resolved by applying the new social model of power relations in
  South East Asia that I have tried to develop. Since this is more of a
  theoretical paper than a case study, both examples of Burmese and Thai
  \textit{Buddhisms} will be utilized without strict stratifications since my
  aim is to shed light on the social model I have attempted to understand and
  develop in my studies of the religious traditions of South and Southeast Asia.

  \section{Body}

  There are numerous understandings and definitions of freedom and individuality
  that may be found in distant times and in various cultural contexts. In
  \textit{Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy}
  \autocite[233]{Nightingale:2004}, for instance, Andrea Wilson Nightingale
  discusses how Aristotle defined a new type of free individual in Ancient
  Greece. According to Nightingale:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `the perfectly free individual is an analogue for the perfectly free
    activity: since a man is called free if he ``exists for himself and not for
    another'', an activity must be called free if it ``exists for its own
    sake.'' The fact that an individual or an activity does not aim at utility,
    then, is one of the principal markers of his/its freedom. As Aristotle says
    in the Politics, ``to seek utility everywhere is completely inappropriate
    for great-souled and free men'' [\ldots] The free man will choose
    ``useless'' activities precisely because this evinces his freedom'
    \autocite[233]{Nightingale:2004}
  \end{displayquote}
  Aristotle's theory of the free individual cannot be conceptualized without
  understanding his ingenious interpretation of \textit{theoria}, which
  constructed a new type of contemplator\footnotemark. This type of
  contemplator is not supposed to be involved in the world but rather
  contemplates \textit{ad hoc} with a sense of detachment from socio-political
  activity. Aristotle's free individual is thus far from being one in a modern,
  egalitarian democratic system but rather a new type of individual who is
  distinct from other types of socially knit beings.  The dichotomy that is
  proposed between a socially bound and a socially free individual has also been
  portrayed by early social theorists of Ancient and Classical India.
  
  \footnotetext{For more details, see \autocite[Chapter 4]{Nightingale:2004}.}

  In many of his works\footnotemark, Louis Dumont, as in the case of Aristotle,
  invents a new type of individual in Ancient India who transcends the social
  matrix through renunciation from the world. According to Dumont:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `For more than two millennia Indian society has been characterised by two
    complementary features: society imposes upon every person a tight
    interdependence which substitutes constraining relationship for the
    individual as we know him, but, on the other hand, there is the institution
    of world-renunciation which allows for the full independence of the man who
    chooses it. Incidentally, this man, the renouncer, is responsible for all
    the innovations in religion that India has seen'
    \autocite[94--95]{Dumont:1982}.
  \end{displayquote}
  \footnotetext{See \autocite{Dumont:1982, Dumont:1988}.}
  Similarly to Nightingale's analysis, Dumont suggests that at a critical moment
  in Indian history, a profound shift was created between men who participated
  in the world and men that renounced it for the sake of freedom, or spiritual
  liberation. It is indeed interesting to observe that the notion of freedom and
  individuality are often portrayed as the protagonists of change at critical
  points in the history for both civilizations. There seem to be two main
  differences, however, between Aristotle's understanding of a free individual
  and Dumont's analysis of Indian socio-ontological development: Firstly, the
  former is explicitly defined and is indeed a primary source while the latter
  is a secondary source and is more or less based on speculation. Secondly, the
  former may be understood in relation to \textit{theoria}, while the latter
  only in relation to the concept of ritualization. Both differences are
  noteworthy because Dumont's analysis of Indian civilization is partially
  influenced by theoretical works that deal with the practice of ritualization
  in archaic societies\footnotemark.

  \footnotetext{It might be reductive to completely differentiate
  \textit{theoria} from ritualization. Nightingale identifies a historical shift
  in the conceptualization of \textit{theoria} which heavily relates to the
  topic of this paper.  She explains that \textit{theoria} had connotations of
  participating in religious spectacles (ritual?) and that such connotation had
  been replaced by another type of \textit{theoria} which implies a form of
  internalized ritual. She claims that the term `philosopher' as we know it
  today derives from the latter connotation. See
  \autocite[36]{Nightingale:2001}.}

  In order to understand why Dumont's analysis is a melange of speculation and
  theoretical borrowings, we must refer to his academic entourage. It is
  important to note that Dumont was a pupil of Marcel Mauss
  \autocite[475]{Madan:1999}, a nephew of Emile Durkheim, who wrote influential
  sociological/anthropological works which offered a clarifying analysis of the
  social implications of gift exchanges in archaic societies
  \autocite[72]{Mauss:1954}. One of Mauss' fundamental understandings of
  sacrificial gift-giving in archaic societies is that:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `to give is to show one's superiority, to show that one is something more
    and higher, that one is \textit{magister}. To accept without returning or
    repaying more is to face subordination, to become a client and subservient'
    \autocite[72]{Mauss:1954}
  \end{displayquote}
  Mauss hence imagines a sacrificial realm where the material exchange between a
  sponsor and sacrificer creates a shift in the balance of power between the two
  and hence ties them together.  Having been inspired by Mauss' theory of gift
  exchange, Dumont and scholars of his legacy applied their learnings onto
  Ancient and Classical Indian Civilizations. The scholar who has applied Mauss'
  findings to the extreme is J.C. Heesterman, who is quite well-known among
  Indologists for his captivating refinement of the theory that the gift Mauss
  refers to is fairly reminiscent of the \textit{daksinas}, offered to ritualist
  by the sponsor of Vedic rituals \autocite[27]{Heesterman:1985}. In other
  words, `the gift is held to embody the sins of the donor, whom it rids of evil
  by transferring the dangerous and demeaning burden of death and impurity to
  the recipient' \autocite[459]{Parry:1986}. Thus, according to Heesterman, the
  problematic nature of the social ties that Dumont refers to are the result of
  the short and long-term processes of pollution of gifts offered by the patrons
  (prototypically ksatriyas) onto the sacrificers (prescriptively Brahmins). It
  is, therefore, from the avoidance of a sacrificial exchange between giver and
  receiver, that the Brahmin developed the individualistic practice of
  asceticism \autocite[39]{Heesterman:1985}. There is thus a clear delineation
  between a free, pure, ascetic and a social, impure, bound ritualist.

  Brain K. Smith insightfully remarks that Heesterman's theory is not merely an
  extrapolation of Dumont's, but is also heavily influenced by the
  anthropological writings of the former's contemporaries
  \autocite[41]{Smith:1989}\footnotemark. Firstly, the transition from the
  Pre-Classical interdependent householder and the classical independent
  renunciant, in Heesterman's eyes, is concomitant with the transition from the
  pre-classical sacrifice to the classical ritual \autocite[41]{Smith:1989}.
  Heesterman portrays the pre-classical sacrifice as a violent
  \textit{mise-en-sc\`ene}, symbolising `death and destruction
  \autocite[38]{Heesterman:1985}, and contrasts it with the pure, `fail-safe
  certainty of ritualism' \autocite[38]{Heesterman:1985}.  Furthermore, such
  dramatic socio-ontological shift is not due to an implicit `gradual and
  cumulative process of erosion' but an explicit `conscious reform'
  \autocite[38]{Heesterman:1985}.  Moreover, Smith rightly points out that
  Heesterman associates the violent nature of sacrifice with striking similarity
  to the way Ren\'e Girard does in his \textit{Violence and the Sacred}
  \autocite[42]{Smith:1989}.

  \footnotetext{The following three paragraphs are taken from a paper I already
  submitted this year. The title of the paper: `Is ``The Inner Conflict of
  Tradition'' a Valid Construct for the Analysis of Change and Continuity in
  Indian Religions?'.}

  Similarly to Girard's view, `[i]t is purely the actual and actualized logical
  conundrum and social problem of the necessity of death for the continuation of
  life that Heesterman posits as the mysterious sacrificial darkness'
  \autocite[42]{Smith:1989}. Furthermore, Heesterman's depiction of the
  Classical ritual as an escape from the meaningfully destructive reality of
  sacrifice \autocite[54]{Heesterman:1981} is stunningly reminiscent of J.F.
  Staal's suggestion that `[t]o say that ritual is done for its own sake is to
  say that it is meaningless, without function, aim or goal, or also that it
  constitutes its own aim or goal' \autocite[9]{Staal:1979}. Heesterman,
  therefore, in the light of Girard, Staal, and Mauss' theories, depicts the
  role of the Hindu ascetic as a \textit{rebellious} figure who avoids the
  dangerous and polluting mechanisms of socially engaged ritualism.  The
  dichotomy between the Brahmin householder and the Hindu ascetic is thus
  construed as an internally forged opposition between freedom and entrapment.
  Although, as Smith remarks, Heesterman's analysis derives from a mansion of
  theoretical borrowings, the most controversial aspect of Heesterman's study is
  that the discussed socio-ontological development in `traditional' India is
  depicted as orthogenetic, or in other words, as internal developments within
  the same cultural framework. Gonda remarks that:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `There is of course room for the observation that this consciousness of
    continuity on the part of the Hindus themselves is not based on scientific
    research and insight, that the \textit{Upanishads} which were incorrectly
    considered to be the Veda proper were anachronistically interpreted in the
    light of later beliefs and convictions, that in studying the ancient
    traditions teachers and religious leaders as a rule had not the faintest
    notion of historical causality, that commentaries and explanations were
    written and handed down without any historical or philological basis. This
    consciousness of continuity is on the contrary based on mere
    tradition-ridden community which has unshakable belief in pre-historic
    ``revealed'' origin of its views, institutions and way of life would think
    of anything like an interruption of the tradition by which they feel
    themselves to be connected with that ``revelation''\,'
    \autocite[14]{Gonda:1965}.
  \end{displayquote}
  Gonda avers a valid point which is to not only doubt the limitations of
  contemporaneous methodologies but also the veracity of particular past claims
  asserted by the actual players who, to a full extent, played part in the
  dynamic process of change and continuity in pre-modern India. In the case of
  Heesterman, it is possible to conclude that it is the actual collation of
  contemporaneous methodologies with the methodological stance of orthogenesis
  that was influenced by the primary sources themselves
  \autocite[69]{Olivelle:1993}, which enabled the author to produce his
  \textit{inner conflict of methodologies}. Truth is relative, but more
  fundamentally, distinct systems of truths are prone to incompatibility when
  they are purposefully used to construct a diachronic analysis of an imagined
  civilization.

  The binary opposition between social attachment and detachment via
  ritualization, constructed in ``the inner conflict of tradition'', does not
  exclusively fit an orthogenetic model. The conceptual opposition between the
  categories \textit{Br\=ahma{\d n}as and \'Srama{\d n}as}, householders and
  renunciants, in the context of ritual, had also been transposed into other
  dichotomies such as ``Vedic'' and ``non-Vedic'' \autocite[69]{Olivelle:1993},
  and Aryan and non-Aryan \autocite[39--40]{Bronkhorst:1999} This argument is
  primarily supported by Johannes Bronkhorst, who focuses on forms of
  interaction between ``Vedic'' and ``non-Vedic'' ideas via textual evidence.
  Bronkhorst's methodological conclusion that in order to validate the ``inner
  conflict of tradition'' one must take into account the earlier borrowing of
  knowledge from others \autocite[43--44]{Bronkhorst:1999} demonstrates that the
  attempt to resolve the inner dynamics within one tradition has indirectly
  resulted in the study of the exchange of ideas between different traditions.
  In his work on \textit{Greater Magadha}, for instance, Bronkhorst argues that
  the contents of the \textit{\=Apastamba Dharmas\=utra} is a testimony of
  crucial epistemological interaction:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `\ldots during the late-Vedic and early post-Vedic period there was a form
    of asceticism which can safely be called Vedic asceticism because it
    remained close to the Vedic sacrifice in its aims and practices. Moreover,
    this Vedic asceticism was clearly distinct from the asceticism which we have
    come to know in connection with Greater Magadha'
    \autocite[85]{Bronkhorst:2007}.
  \end{displayquote}
  It is clear from Bronkhorst's statement that Vedic asceticism is explicitly
  contrasted with the asceticism of Greater Magadha, the latter being the area
  which fostered Buddhist soteriological paradigms \autocite[46]{Erdosy:1993}.
  Since the type of asceticism that had originated in Magadha is not closely
  related to the Vedic sacrifice, it implies that the idea of renunciation as an
  antithesis to the external exchange of sacrificial offerings had originated
  from there.  This, in turn, would suggest that the borrowing of the ascetic
  practices from Magadha has resulted through a crystallization of ideas, which
  had become the phenomenological object of Heesterman's ``inner conflict of
  tradition''.

  The sudden shift from an orthogenetic to a polygenetic lens in Vedic studies
  especially through textual sources is risky business. By strictly following a
  geographical division and over-crediting external influences, one may follow
  the path of H. S.  Converse's notorious proposal that `everything new,
  creative and interesting was attributed to the non-Aryans, proto-Dravidians
  and proto-Jains' \autocite[586]{Bodewitz:1997}. This hypothesis, as well as
  Bronkhorst's, assumes a clear-cut division between ``Vedic'' and ``non-Vedic''
  categories while there is not enough proof to confirm such explicit
  geographical and ethnic distinctions \autocite[163]{Olivelle:1995}. Patrick
  Olivelle summarizes quite well the faulty adherence to the categories
  ``Vedic'' and ``non-Vedic'' especially when they are used interchangeably with
  Aryan and non-Aryan:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `It is obvious that vedic society contained large numbers of people whose
    roots were non-Aryan and that their customs and beliefs must have influenced
    the dominant Aryan classes. It is a quite different matter, however, to
    attempt to isolate non-Aryan customs, beliefs, or traits at a period a
    millennium or more removed from the initial Aryan migration. The vedic
    literature, as \autocite[200]{Gonda:1965} observes, does not give us a
    complete account of the religious life of the Aryans. That some aspects we
    observe at a later period are absent in earlier texts is no proof of their
    absence at that time or of their non-Aryan provenance'
    \autocite[68]{Olivelle:1993}.
  \end{displayquote}
  Olivelle is clearly against relying on the two-source hypothesis without
  giving credit to some internal continuity within the Vedic ideology. According
  to him, one-sidedness concerning the exchanges or developments of ideas is
  nonsensical, for historical reality is not the product of `neat
  categorizations of both ancient Indian theologians and modern scholars'
  \autocite[163]{Olivelle:1995}. Olivelle therefore suggests that it is the
  interaction between the external influences and the internal elements of the
  brahmanical tradition, which should enable one to come up with more
  constructive conclusions regarding the development of traditional Indian
  socio-ontological thought \autocite[68]{Olivelle:1993}. This, in turn, would
  fuse the Manichaean stance of the one-source and two-source methodological
  stances into a more complex and truthful account. One can therefore postulate
  that by finding a balance between Heesterman's and Bronkhorst's theories, one
  ends up contextualizing the former's diachronic model, and de-contextualizing
  the latter's synchronic model. In other words, since Heesterman's theory is
  simplistic due to its risky adherence to the purely orthogenetic model and
  Bronkhorst's polygenetic model reduces the structural ritualization dichotomy
  into a mere temporal crystallization of ideas between two (or more) distinct
  traditions, the collation of the two stances may provide us with some kind of
  pan-chronic model, which endorses a profound dialectic between myth and
  factuality. After all, even Heesterman's greatest critics, such as Ronald
  Inden, admits that despite of the former's untenable orthogenetic model, there
  is indeed some truth in constructing a continuous social dichotomy between
  pure and impure modes of life in Brahminical soteriology
  \autocite[766]{Inden:1986}.

  Space does not allow us to systematically construct a pan-chronic account of
  the Brahmanical ritualization dichotomy yet it would be invaluable to
  understand why such a dichotomy is crucially linked to pre-modern Indian
  notions of the individual\footnotemark. Anthony T. Carter, in the following
  manner, presupposes a clear distinction between the modernist western and
  pre-modern Indian notions of the person:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `In the Euro-American case the person is conceived as an individual,
    ontologically prior to any collectivity and containing within himself all of
    the attributes of humanity. Conversely, in this ``individualistic universe''
    society as a whole is regarded as ``\textit{in principle} two things at
    once: a \textit{collection of individuals} and a \textit{collective
    individual}''
    \autocite[33]{Dumont:1970} % DUBIOUS: Original lists year as 1971
    In the contrasting Indian case the social whole, informed by the
    hierarchical opposition of pure and impure, is ontologically prior to any
    empirical actor. In this holistic universe particular human beings are
    regarded as possessing different and unequal attributes of humanity and are
    not associated with any normative principle'.
    % \autocite[119]{Carter:1982}.
    %
    % DUBIOUS: MISSING CITATION. The original text refers to Carter 1982, but
    % makes no further mention in the bibliography. The only corpus in which
    % this text can be found is `Pastoral Counseling Across Cultures' by David
    % W. Augsburger (1986).
  \end{displayquote}
  According to Carter, there is no room for individuality in the sense of agency
  in `traditional' Indian thought because the purity of the psychologically
  molded being is already predetermined by the cosmological body (e.g.
  \textit{varna}, \textit{j\=ati}). This of course correlates well with Dumont's
  view that `hierarchy is inseparable from holism, the valorisation of the
  social whole rather than the human individual'
  \autocite[156--157]{Parry:1998}. Although Carter does have a point in
  regarding the Premodern Indian as one which is predetermined by the
  cosmological body, he nevertheless does not include those individuals who
  managed to transcend such predeterminations. Isn't it after all the renouncers
  who had eventually liberated themselves from the predeterminations of the
  cosmos? This question is, in my opinion, a crucial key for understanding
  Dumont's characterization of the renouncer as an ideally free individual
  because the main difference between the householder and the ascetic in terms
  of individuality seems to be that the former conceives one's conscious human
  body as being attuned to the governing laws of the macrocosm while the latter
  transcends the pre-deterministic cosmic laws via the embodiment of the
  absolute. In other words, the individual body, clearly distinguished from the
  servant of the cosmological body, aims to embody the macrocosm through the
  practice of asceticism. As we shall see, this does not entirely solve our
  understanding of individuality in Pre-modern India.

  \footnotetext{It should be understood by now that the notion of the individual
  in Pre-modern India is based on Western conceptions which cannot be fully
  applied onto the Brahminical context, but I choose to use this term for the
  sake of pedagogic illustration.}

  For some prominent scholars of Indian religious traditions, the practice of
  Brahmanical or Buddhist asceticism does not result in a liberated individual,
  but quite the contrary. In \textit{The Ascetic Self}, Gavin Flood attempts to
  universalize the social role of ascetics within culturally rich textual
  traditions \autocite[16]{Flood:2004}. His main point, which he applies onto
  mediaeval Christian, Classical Indian, and Theravada Buddhist traditions is
  the following:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `The ascetic internalises the tradition, subjectively appropriating it and
    conforming his body, speech and mind to the forms prescribed. He eliminates
    his individuality, as it were, through a subjective intensification. The
    ascetic body is inscribed by tradition and becomes the text, in the sense
    that the ascetic inscribes his body as a text'
    \autocite[82]{Flood:2004}.
  \end{displayquote}
  Flood's claim is reminiscent of what has previously been proposed regarding
  the role of the ascetic in terms of the process of embodiment. Indeed,
  according to Flood, the ascetic embodies tradition (in this sense tradition
  means some form of cosmic truth that is shared by a group of social beings)
  but this form of internalization ends up transforming the body into an emblem
  of tradition. This emblematic body in turn strengthens the tradition in which
  the ascetic is affiliated with because it (the body) is alive and endowed with
  subjectivity. This evidently clashes with our earlier supposition that it is
  the sacrificing householder who is bound to cosmic hence social determinations
  while it is in fact the renouncer who transcends the confines of determination
  through the internalization of sacrifice. I suspect this friction between
  Flood's and our revised interpretation of Dumont's individual occurs because
  the former's criticism of Dumont's conception of the individual is based on
  certain misconceptions. Flood evidently applies the modernist
  psycho-sociological view of the individual onto the Indian context.
  Otherwise, one would not have to ask why the individuality of the ascetic is
  destroyed through the practice of asceticism if the individual is already
  socially predetermined by a holistic paradigm. Moreover, the fact that the
  author uses the term \textit{habitus} (and attaches supportive bibliographical
  references to it) in order to conceptualize the ascetic body
  \autocite[6]{Flood:2004}, it can be maintained that Flood's conception of the
  person and its relationship to the body is chimed with the ideas of the
  sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who clearly views the individual body as one
  which is subconsciously regulated by social norms \autocite[6]{Flood:2004}.
  It is therefore apparent that the ascetic for the author is merely an
  instrument (although a powerful one), which propagates the memory of the
  textual tradition through the concomitant destruction of individuality and the
  rise of subjectivity within the ascetic's body\footnotemark. Flood's analysis
  is indeed at odds with some individualistic notions in Premodern India yet the
  author has repeated a more significant methodological error which also
  Anthropologists carrying fieldwork involved themselves in. Richard Burghart,
  in his analysis of renunciation in South Asian traditions, pinpoints the flaw
  of adhering to a univocal interpretation of asceticism. He states:
  \begin{displayquote}
    `Most anthropologists who have carried out fieldwork in south Asia have
    focused their attention either on the village as a locality or on caste as
    an institution. In consequence, anthropological theories of Hindu asceticism
    have been based, for the most part, on perceptions of ascetics from the
    point of view of the world which they have renounced. Moreover,
    anthropological recourse to indological texts has merely confirmed the bias
    of fieldworking anthropologists, for most comments on the social aspects of
    renunciation have been derived from the prescriptive texts which were
    compiled by Brahman householders or, possibly eremitic householders, but not
    by renouncing ascetics'
    \autocite[635]{Burghart:1983}.
  \end{displayquote}

  \footnotetext{Since Bourdieu's theories apply to all modern individuals who
  unconsciously embody their symbolic reality, it would be interesting to
  investigate why Flood chose to present the ascetic as one who consciously
  attunes his body for the sake of the tradition \autocite[6]{Flood:2004}.}

  Burghart makes a fine point in criticizing the way in which Indologists
  conceptualize the Hindu ascetic from the point of view of the Brahmin
  householder. Why would the non-ascetic depict the ascetic as one who
  transcends the confines of tradition if one's purpose is to preserve the
  tradition?  By characterizing the ascetic as an instrument for the
  preservation of tradition, the non-ascetic from the same tradition purposely
  ends up characterizing the ascetic as a secondary component, or an extended
  aspect of the tradition. From his fieldwork experience, Burghart explains that
  not only is a univocal definition of the ascetic fundamentally incomplete, but
  that:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `[t]here is now material at hand to examine the adequacy of Dumont's general
    formulation. This material suggests that no simple dichotomy can describe
    the relation between Brahman householder and renouncer,for these two persons
    situate themselves in different conceptual universes-the Brahman householder
    in an organic universe and the ascetic in a temporal one.  Since each person
    sees the other through the terms of reference of his own world, their
    interrelations can be described only by considering their different
    perceptions of the events in which they interact'
    \autocite[636]{Burghart:1983}.
  \end{displayquote}
  Burghart's insightful remark allows us to observe different figures who embody
  different conceptual paradigms, one which is more concerned with individual
  embodiment (the ascetic) and one which is more focused on being in tune with
  the cosmic world (brahmin householder). At this point, the individual ceases
  to be our focal point of interest, because what apparently constructs the
  disparity between these different types of social beings is not determined by
  notions of individuality (which have been proven to be the products of western
  presuppositions), but the way in which knowledge and power is produced by
  protagonists (in Burghart's case two) who locate their minds and bodies within
  distinct socio-ontological paradigms.

  We have seen so far that the paradigmatic model of purity and impurity is
  distinct from the microcosm-macrocosm paradigm for the former is founded on
  the dependency of ritualization while the latter is to a large extent
  preoccupied with the notion of internalization\footnotemark. These two
  paradigmatic forces, one based on determinism while the other on
  processuality, are, at least, within an ethnocentric perspective,
  characterized to have been originally conflictual ones. We must be, however,
  skeptical about the axiomatic claim that these two paradigmatic forces were
  working with, or even originated from socio-ontological tensions. Contrary to
  what is usually presupposed, it might be postulated that the processual
  paradigms may have indeed originated out of inspiration, or out of sheer
  ingenuity. Ted Proferes suggests that according to the Vedic texts, the notion
  of equating the individual body with the cosmos, ātman with Brahman, microcosm
  with the macrocosm, originated during an act of ritualization, by the
  brahmins, for the Vedic king \autocite[152]{Proferes:2007}. Proferes states a
  highly stimulating point which is worth quoting in full:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `From the time of the Vedic hymns, royal power was represented as universal
    and absolute; every ruler claimed his place at the center of the cosmos,
    however peripheral his position may have been in reality. Increasingly, we
    find the assertion of the ruler's physical identification with his domain,
    as well as with the cosmos as a whole. As the embodiment of the universe, he
    was the ideal not merely of political power, but of spiritual power as well.
    When others contrasted their own political, economic, and social position to
    that of the sovereign, it highlighted their own limited freedom and status
    and made the king's own position appear ever more grand, even absolute. The
    king was looked upon by all as the embodiment of political autonomy, while
    others saw themselves as dependent entirely upon forces outside their
    control. As the figure of the king was projected upon the cosmos and
    identified with it, the political freedom and power of the king came to
    symbolize spiritual freedom and spiritual power. In this way, concepts of
    sovereignty inspired a whole new set of religious values and ideas, many of
    which contributed to the speculative explorations of spiritual liberation
    recorded in the early Upanishads. The idea of the identity of microcosm and
    macrocosm was enhanced by the identification of the king with his dominion,
    idealized as the universe in its entirety. The paradigm of sovereignty was
    thus formative for a language of symbolism of spiritual aspiration that went
    on to dominate religious discourse in India for centuries. The ideal
    attributes of a great king became the model for the spiritual aspirations
    even of those with no claim to political power. Gradually, the political
    aspect of the ideal faded, and was preserved only in certain key metaphors
    employed in what was now a new discourse of spiritual freedom. Thus it might
    even be said that late Vedic and Early Hindu spirituality reflects the
    popularization of the ideals of an ambitious king'
    \autocite[152]{Proferes:2007}.
  \end{displayquote}
  Proferes claims that the paradigmatic model of microcosm and macrocosm as a
  means to liberation, out of all the individuals, could have been firstly
  applied onto the king. This in turn inspired others without such authority to
  internalise the cosmos and hence achieve liberation. Individual freedom is
  thus attained through internalisation, because without it, one is merely a
  reductive substance of the cosmos within a relatively deterministic framework.
  Proferes' insightful interpretation, in some ways, reveals to us a new player
  in the discourse (the king) of body/mind paradigms, and thus opens a gateway
  to an analysis of power relations between householder, ascetic and king.

  \footnotetext{Part of this paragraph is taken from a paper I already submitted
  this year. The title of the paper is: `Analyzing the dynamics of symbolic
  paradigms of the body in the development of Premodern Brahminical and Buddhist
  traditions: A Critique of Univocality'.}

  Having acknowledged that different types of symbolic protagonists in
  Pre-modern India share a particular worldview yet situate their minds and
  bodies in different conceptual paradigms, it is possible to postulate that we
  are dealing here with a multi-vocal environment. Burghart and Dumont detect a
  tension between the Hindu ascetic and the Brahmin householder, Heesterman
  views a conflict between the Brahmin and their endangering patrons, and
  Proferes envisions a symbolic dialectic between Kings and self-empowered
  ascetics. All of these relationships, in my view, are inherently linked
  through symbolic paradigms of the body because each type of agent has his
  unique soteriological and epistemological position in the social-ontological
  matrix. Richard Valantasis concludes in his analysis of ascetics, a definition
  which could be applied more broadly in the Pre-modern Indian context:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `With regard to asceticism this simple definition addresses many of the
    issues raised above: the construction of reality and truth, which embraces a
    wide spectrum of intellectual, theological, literary, and political
    knowledge, as well as specific ideological and logonomic frames; the social
    situation of asceticism in which the practice and teaching of the ascetic
    distinguishes itself from the practice and lives of the non-ascetic; the
    importance and centrality of practices and technologies to the ascetic
    program in which the practices at once construct power and modulate social
    concerns; the critical linking of solidarity/sociality with power as inverse
    descriptions of one another; and, finally, the production of systems that
    support the ascetic's subjectivity, social relations, and symbolic universe.
    The capacity to change and the capacity to affect the productive environment
    of another subject (even when that ``other subject'' is simply a
    redefinition of one's own self) implicate a wide assortment of human
    activity.  Ascetical power, then, produces the capacity for change and a
    capacity to affect the environment in which change is produced'
    \autocite[793]{Valantasis:1995}.
  \end{displayquote}
  I think Valantasis' conclusion encompasses not only the ascetic but also other
  important protagonists such as the kings and the Brahmin householders since
  each group embodies its respective conceptual socio-ontological paradigm. The
  ascetic can therefore be seen as one who embodies his own soteriological goal,
  the Householder as one who embodies the Vedic tradition, and the King as one
  who embodies the political cosmology. Of course, these portrayals are
  invariably simplistic because they assume continuities which may not exist but
  they are indeed useful for us in order to start conceptualizing how these
  symbolic agents eventually end up generating multiple layers of truths. Thus,
  ascetics, householders, and kings, each create systems on their own even
  though these differing views may be portrayed at times as a conglomeration of
  knowledge in flux.

  A critical question in this paper is whether these social dynamics may be also
  applied to Pre-modern Buddhist or contemporary Theravada Buddhist
  polities\footnotemark. We need to acknowledge that Theravada Buddhism
  encompasses many elements which are foreign to the western conception of what
  Southeast Asian Buddhists had pejoratively labelled as `Protestant Buddhism'
  \autocite[7]{Gombrich:1990}. Since Brahminical as well as indigenous cultural
  traits constantly form what we call today Theravada Buddhism, it would be
  reductive to apply a static definition and to disassociate it from pre-modern
  Indian conceptions of sovereignty and empowerment \autocite[x]{Swearer:2010}.
  The links can be already observed from a relatively simplistic analysis of the
  relationship between kings and \textit{sangha} in Buddhist polities. Buddhist
  rule, since the time of \textit{A\`soka}, could not be propagated without a
  particular relationship between the king and the \textit{sangha}. Such a
  relationship arose only when the king sponsored the \textit{sangha}. If the
  \textit{sangha} accepted such sponsorship, the king gained legitimacy through
  maintaining the Buddhist \textit{\'s\=asana} \autocite[67]{Ferguson:1978}. The
  process of sponsorship and legitimation occurred via a particular merit-making
  ritual, which symbolically affirmed the king's authority. Following the
  completion of the ritual, kings officially become a \textit{dhammaraja}, or
  \textit{cakkavatin} \autocite[52]{Tambiah:1976}. Such king/\textit{sangha}
  relationships in South-East Asia were described by Tambiah as ``galactic
  polity'', which acknowledged the particular power relations between the kings
  and the \textit{sangha} \autocite[252]{Tambiah:1985}. Although the kings had
  legitimacy to rule, they could not in theory act against the \textit{dhamma},
  which is in essence the highest source of authority
  \autocite[194]{Jordt:2007}. The \textit{sangha}, which represent the authority
  behind the \textit{dhamma} may determine whether or not the kings are
  neglecting `the conditions of their own power' \autocite[252]{Tambiah:1985}.
  Another important force in resisting claims of kingship is `the charisma
  gained [\ldots] by ascetic practice[s] [\ldots] recognized as signs of merit
  and power and capable of upstaging hereditary claims to kingship'
  \autocite[265--269]{Tambiah:1985}. The explicit parallelisms between
  Pre-modern Indian and Theravada Buddhist polities is equally observable in Ian
  Harris' synopsis of power dynamics of the latter:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `Theravada Buddhist conceptions of sovereignty did not really differentiate
    between ``political leadership'' and ``charismatic authority'' [\ldots],
    for the king's status was also determined by his possession of merit stored
    up over previous lives. But monarchical claims are only one side of the coin
    in understanding the relations between power and political authority.  The
    monastic order (\textit{sangha}) was itself perfectly capable of challenging
    the state when it seemed significantly out of line with Theravada virtues.
    Quite apart from any other consideration, the impact of large numbers of
    able-bodied monastics in a state of withdrawal from economic activity has
    done much to shape the societies and cultures of Theravada lands for
    centuries, and monastic law (\textit{vinaya}) has provided the basis on
    which many ``larger political structures rest''
    \autocite[265--269]{Tambiah:1985}. In addition, the renunciation represented
    by the \textit{sangha}, and in particular by those members of the order who
    undertake ascetic practices (\textit{dhutanga}) at the periphery of society,
    in the wilderness for example, is traditionally held to generate prodigious
    quantities of power which may then be transmitted to amulets and relics
    deemed to be especially convenient physical receptacles for concentrating
    and storing this supernatural energy (Thai: \textit{saksit}).  Possession of
    such special objects confers great power on their custodians, be they rulers
    or those who seek their overthrow. In this context, then, it is perhaps not
    too much of an exaggeration to suggest that a healthily functioning Buddhist
    polity is one in which the respective powers of king and \textit{sangha} are
    held in a state of antagonistic symbiosis'
    \autocite[3]{Harris:2007}.
  \end{displayquote}
  Harris clearly observes an `antagonistic symbiosis' between the monarchy, the
  Buddhist \textit{sangha}, and self-empowered ascetics in Thai Buddhist
  history. This portrayal is indeed akin to the already examined Pre-modern
  Indian context. In a similar way to the Pre-modern Brahminical context, the
  king embodies the polity, under the supervision of the \textit{sangha}, who
  embody the supramundane \textit{dhamma}, yet the peripheral ascetic gains
  self-empowerment through a process of embodiment, which is not necessarily
  dependent on both the authority of the king and the \textit{sangha}. Since
  there is an explicitly similar interplay of embodiments by different agents in
  both Theravada Buddhist and Brahminical contexts, it is possible to claim that
  such structures of social dynamics are not necessarily Buddhist or
  non-Buddhist, Brahminical or non-Brahminical, or either Buddhist or
  Brahminical. It is perhaps an amorphous form of acultural intelligence (that
  seems to have originated in India) which acknowledges the role of the body and
  embodiment without strict correlations to particular religious identifications
  and stratifications.

  \footnotetext{Part of this paragraph is taken from a paper I submitted a year
  ago. The title of the paper is: `Between External and Internal Ritualisation:
  An Assessment of Colonial Influence On Traditional Burmese Power Relations'.}

  Part of the confusion in applying this triadic category in Pre-modern India
  onto Theravada Buddhist contexts has to do with identifying the Buddhist
  \textit{sangha} as ascetics, as opposed to householders
  \autocite[15--16]{Cook:2010}. Cook explains why this distinction is
  superficial:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `Buddhist monasteries in Thailand vary widely in focus and institutional
    organization and we must be careful not to assume a necessary correlation
    between monasticism and asceticism, or indeed between meditation and
    asceticism, in any given context. [\ldots] I do not use the term ``ascetic''
    to describe all people who ``renounce the world'' or become monastics: to be
    a monastic one does not have to engage in ascetic practices and vice versa.
    It is not necessarily the case at all that monastics, though they have
    renounced home, sexual activity and marriage, are necessarily then to be
    understood as engaging in ascetic practices'
    \autocite[15--16]{Cook:2010}.
  \end{displayquote}
  There is therefore a clear delineation between those who practice asceticism
  and those who are merely part of the monastic order. The reason why Theravada
  Buddhist monks are regarded as ascetics is mainly because they renounce their
  home, sacrifice worldly pleasures and engage in meditation. Part of this
  confusion also has to do with Dumont's static image of the Hindu renouncer as
  a responsible agent for innovative ideologies such as what we call Buddhism.
  The truth of the matter is that the borders between Brahmanic and Buddhist
  traditions are much more blurred than they seem since the constant
  intermingling between these two (textual?) traditions are even highly visible
  today \autocite[202]{Skilling:2007}. Peter Skilling, by investigating the
  relationship between the Buddhist \textit{sangha} and the Brahmins in
  Thailand, arrived at a similar conclusion:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `In this chapter, I have examined the ideals of kingship and of two powerful
    social institutions, the monastic order (\textit{sangha}) and the brahmans.
    The ideals are hybrid, distinctively Thai, set in a complex cosmology. The
    texts that support this hybridism include \textit{j\=atakas},
    \textit{n{\=\i i}ti}, law books, and ritual manuals. Ritual languages have
    included Thai, Khmer, Sanskrit, and Pali, and in some cases Tamil and Mon.
    South-East Asian law books (\textit{dharma\`sastra}) and chants for
    Brahmanical ceremonies cite verses or passages in Pali: that is, Pali
    becomes the classical legal and ceremonial language of the region.
    Traditions overlap, and replenish each other. Other sources are multivocal.
    I have not expected to find, let alone construct, a single definition of
    kingship, or of the relations between ruler, \textit{sangha}, and brahmans'
    \autocite[202]{Skilling:2007}.
  \end{displayquote}
  This intense form of syncretism between the various textual traditions impedes
  Skilling to coherently trace the dynamics between ruler, \textit{sangha} and
  brahmans.  Since Brahmins and Buddhist are inherently linked to the service of
  legitimating sovereignty, it could be misleading to regard the Brahmins and
  Buddhists as two separate forces in the overall dynamics of power relations.
  If Skilling were to regard the Brahmins and Buddhists as separate agents who
  more or less position themselves in the same position in the power matrix
  (legitimating the king's rule and embodying the authority of their respective
  textual corpus) depending on historical context, perhaps harmony will override
  cacophony in his conclusive analysis. Jacques Leider proposes that the
  relationship between Brahmin and Buddhist monk in ritualistic context has to
  do with practical cooperation as opposed to ideological tension:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `for life in this world, Buddhism holds an ethical message for monks and for
    laypeople alike.  But the rituals it produced proved insufficient for such
    earthly needs as the consecration of a king and the engineering of political
    questions by supernatural means. For such needs, the Buddhist courts of
    Southeast asia heavily borrowed from the indian tradition. [\ldots] as
    generally acknowledged, Brahmins played an essential role in the ritual of
    king making (ablution ceremonies [abhiseka]) at the courts of the Buddhist
    kings, where Brahmins were also employed as astrologers. Their functions
    were related to the transmission and the practice of special knowledge
    imported from india. In Burma (myanmar) and arakan (rakhaing), these
    `Brahmins' were generally called \textit{punna}. Though their presence at
    court is a well-known fact, they have as yet attracted no particular
    scholarly interest'
    \autocite[159--160]{Leider:2005}.
  \end{displayquote}
  The lack of scholarly interest, I suspect, derives from the fact that the
  coupling of Brahminical and Buddhist services appear as cacophanous and hence
  unintelligible for a coherent analysis of Burmese Buddhist social dynamics.
  Since it is possible to postulate that the Buddhists employed the Brahmins
  because the former did not specialize in earthly \textit{rites de passage},
  what seems at first ambiguous and unclear in terms of religious organization
  suddenly appears completely sensical and practical from a Buddhist
  perspective. Yet, such clarifications only form a minute part in
  deconstructing some rigid classifications which impede us from observing the
  rich and multi-vocal dimensions of social dynamics in Theravada Buddhist
  polities.

  One of the fundamental problems in understanding the social dynamics in these
  religious traditions has to do with the way in which the western definer,
  during and after the period of colonization in South-East Asia, invented a
  scientific category called Buddhism\footnotemark. In fact, it is generally
  claimed that the transmission of foreign knowledge onto Southeast Asian soil
  generated significant changes, which `involved the fate of the \textit{sangha}
  and of Buddhism itself' \autocite[67]{Mendelson:1975}. Various forms of
  knowledge, ranging from scientific to Christian teachings, were diffused along
  Burmese terrain resulting in an incongruous clash with indigenous Buddhist
  teachings. Even the term Buddhism, unlike \textit{thathanadaw}, did not exist
  prior to colonial contact with the Burmese. Alexey Kirichenko explains that:

  \footnotetext{Parts of the following two paragraphs are taken from a paper I
  submitted a year ago. The title of the paper is: `Between External and
  Internal Ritualisation: An Assessment of Colonial Influence On Traditional
  Burmese Power Relations'.}

  \begin{displayquote}
    `In precolonial Burmese the term \textit{thathanadaw} was literally
    translated as ``instruction'' (\textit{ahson-ama}) and understood as a space
    established by the Buddha which one could enter to achieve complete
    liberation from existence or a better birth. Thus, \textit{thathana} by
    itself obviously was not a ``community,'' ``church'' or ``a form of
    nationhood'' as Obeyesekere claims for Sinhalese \textit{\'s\=asana}, but a
    medium of improvement of one's status in the \textit{sa{\d m}s\=ara}'
    \autocite[30]{Kirichenko:2009}.
  \end{displayquote}
  The notion of Buddhism, as an institutional religion, is a product of western
  epistemology, which `implied a self-identical, objective system based on
  doctrine as well as common horizontal identity for the faithful', in contrast
  to \textit{thathana}, which connotes `a much more complex reality where
  religious and social identities were inseparable and so religious
  participation was mediated by one's social status'
  \autocite[25]{Kirichenko:2009}. Since it is the term Buddhism and not
  \textit{thathana}, which is hitherto investigated, particular conclusions
  regarding historical transitions in Buddhist reign may have been mismanaged.
  Michael Charney, in a relatively recent publication (2006), for instance,
  interprets king Mindon's reign as one which marks:

  \begin{displayquote}
      `an important transition from the ``traditional'' relationship between the
      throne and the monastic order to a new and in view of the continuity of
      the relationship between a throne/state that patronises the Religion while
      not opposing monastic sectarianism as we see today in Burma-modern
      relationship'
      \autocite[219]{Charney:2006}.
  \end{displayquote}
  The notion that it is the state and not the \textit{cakkavatin}, who is
  sponsoring the Religion and not the \textit{sangha}, is evidence for a
  transition from a relatively pure \textit{\'s\=asana}, into a politically
  contrived Buddhism. This claim may be true in terms of \textit{etic} analysis,
  yet as an \textit{emic} approach, considering it a transition may be
  misleading. Michael E. Mendelson, in contrast to Charney's and earlier
  scholars' ``before and after'' claims regarding Mindon's reign, argues that:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `\ldots relations between \textit{sangha} and king were determined by the
    strength of the king at any given time. It is easy to imagine that in
    centrifugal periods the loyalty of monks could easily evaporate, just as, in
    centripetal periods, under such strong kings as Bayinnaung or an Alaungpaya,
    monks, being Burmans, after all, followed the fortunes of their leaders and
    were as loyal to them as any other citizen'
    \autocite[83]{Mendelson:1975}.
  \end{displayquote}
  Mendelson remains fairly critical of views which endorse a profound
  paradigmatic shift in power relations during Mindon's reign. This is mainly
  due to his awareness that prior to western epistemological influences, it is
  mainly the level of support the king bestows upon the \textit{sangha} which primarily
  determines the latter's loyalty to the former \autocite[85]{Mendelson:1975}.
  By offering support, which is evidently a form of generating ritual
  dependency, is therefore the predominant factor that `enable[d] the king to
  control the \textit{sangha} he pretended to set free' \autocite[85]{Mendelson:1975}.
  Paradigmatic changes in Burmese Buddhism claimed by Charney are therefore
  questionable, for he does not take into account the quintessential dimension
  of gift-giving in his political analysis of social cohesion.

  Considering the argument that despite of evident external influences, it is
  primarily the forces from within which determine the balance between unity and
  resistance \autocite[98]{Jordt:2007}, it may be of equal relevance to explore
  the way in which such western external influences affected monastic activity
  in the Burmese context. As mentioned earlier, the westerners' transmission of
  knowledge inevitably endangered the \textit{\'s\=asana} by defining the latter
  as a rival religion. Such epistemological implementations caused distress
  among the \textit{sangha}. Some monks became aware of such dangers and
  believed that it was not the monks but the `lay people [that] had the
  responsibility to protect and promote Buddhism' via the study of the
  \textit{Abhidhamma}, which emphasises \textit{vipassan\=a} meditation
  \autocite[39]{Braun:ND}. It is important to note that before colonial rule,
  the laity were not supposed to meditate, it was strictly reserved for the
  monastic elite \autocite[39]{Braun:ND}. Ledi Sayadaw, a relatively unknown
  monk at the time, was among the prominent figures who formed a mass meditation
  movement by channeling \textit{Abhidhamma} from a strictly monastic practice
  to a `lay practice of self cultivation' \autocite[300]{Braun:2008}. Such
  actions may be interpreted as politically motivated ones since `Ledi's groups
  shared with the YMBA and others the purpose of providing Buddhist education to
  the laity and promoting morality' \autocite[204]{Braun:2008}. Unfortunately
  such a view is inaccurate because it seems that Ledi's groups never took part
  in any political or nationalistic movement \autocite[204]{Braun:2008}. If the
  transmission of religious knowledge to the laity had no evident implications
  for promoting nationalism or external political resistance, the motives must
  have been internal, or at most, social.  Ingrid Jordt argues that the
  transmission of knowledge to the laity by the monks led to `a natural
  affiliation and bond that ultimately may be threatening to a ruler seeking to
  subject his population' \autocite[196]{Jordt:2007} Such implications infer a
  deeper assertion that such transmissions led to a transition from a relatively
  binary relationship in power between king/state and \textit{sangha} into `a
  ternary order in which each has some power in keeping the others in check by
  invoking purification as the outside condition of ultimate moral force'
  \autocite[196]{Jordt:2007}. Such assertions of transitions from pre-colonial
  to post-colonial times, as in the case of Charney, may be subject to flawed
  etic analysis. Gustaaf Houtman disagrees with the common assertion that during
  the colonial era, there was a laicization process, which was responsible for
  changing the power relations from a binary to a ternary one
  \autocite[125]{Houtman:1990}. He argues instead that:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `Considering the way some unordained meditators have a tendency to mark in a
    language their status as ``core'' Buddhists by using monastic language and
    by classifying themselves as monks as described above, one would be better
    off suggesting the reverse, namely that there has been a ``monasticization''
    of the unordained. The emphasis contemporary meditators put on being part of
    the \textit{the-tha-na} does not suggest the radical displacement of old
    roles by new roles and old institutions by new ones [\ldots]. The centrality
    of the monkshood (and the monastery) has not been challenged in the ideal
    and, by aspiring to a Buddhism of the monastery, the meditator in fact
    perpetuates an old order of Buddhism'
    \autocite[125]{Houtman:1990}.
  \end{displayquote}
  Acknowledging how easily one may misconstrue modern political changes for
  traditional continuities as a result of western epistemology onto these
  regions, Houtman, avoids unnecessary assertions. Perhaps there is truth in the
  fact that it is indeed the people and not the monks, who by gradually
  expressing their remorse through the practice of \textit{vipassan\=a}, are
  affecting the balance of power of between the \textit{sangha} and state but it
  is also important to understand that in terms of symbolic exchanges, the laity
  do not form an independent voice of resistance for they do not have a real
  voice within the contrived cosmological paradigm. If the laity were to express
  political resistance in a Buddhist context, they would have to engage
  themselves with \textit{samatha} practices, the meditative practices of the
  ascetic, which seeks self-empowerment \autocite[331]{Houtman:1999}. Yet, as
  long as the laity are practicing insight (\textit{vipassan\=a}), as opposed
  to concentration (\textit{samatha}), they are embodying symbols that belong to
  the authority of the \textit{sangha}.

  In cultural analysis, attempting to approach a particular worldview through
  natural facts may at times be futile because in many cases, views of reality
  derive from contrived expressions and hence understandings. By analyzing
  social developments through factual analysis, one is more prone to be misled
  by the rubrics of rationality, which at times, generate the crux of dissonance
  between distinct worldviews\footnotemark. A good example of this schism is
  expressed in defensive claims by Southeast Asian Buddhists that
  \textit{vipassan\=a} meditation can be stripped of all non-scientific
  influences. Cook explains that:

  \footnotetext{Interestingly enough, by studying an ahistorical symbolic
  wordlview, one does not actually enter into an eternal domain of
  interpretation as opposed to historical realism. The methodology of the former
  is prone to change just as much as the latter due to the fundamental
  differences between different presents. Thus the claim that the mythological
  past is eternally actualized is a myth precisely because the meanings
  contained in the symbolism always undergo change due to the passage of time.
  Thus, the idea of centralizing and controlling the order of the
  \textit{sangha} for the sake of restoring a nostalgic eternal order is
  fundamentally anachronistic because the present notion of eternal order itself
  constantly undergoes transformation.}

  \begin{displayquote}
    `Buddhadasa emphasized \textit{vipassan\=a} as the most important aspect of
    Buddhist spiritual practice and denounced samādhi as central to a
    supernaturalist view of Buddhism [\ldots]. [\ldots] Buddhadasa proposes a
    vision of Thai Buddhism removed from all non-scientific influences (such as
    the transferral of merit, rebirth, heavenly beings, and so on), which may
    act as a model for progressive social development and individual spiritual
    attainment. [\ldots] It is interesting to note, however, that many of
    Buddhadasa's supporters believed that he had attained high levels of
    spiritual power and insight and as such it was especially meritoriously
    accumulative to donate alms to him'
    \autocite[42--43]{Cook:2010}.
  \end{displayquote}
  It is not surprising that the constant attempt to protect Buddhism by
  presenting it as a comprehensive rational system usually generates
  incongruities. These incongruities do not result because Buddhism is
  fundamentally irrational, but precisely because the Buddhist tradition amasses
  both rational and imaginative discourses which were not meant to be separated.
  It is the reaction to Western Imperialist threats that has resulted, from a
  western rationalist perspective, into a contradictory representation of
  Buddhism. These rhetorical incongruities actually derive from the conscious
  and explicit separation of myth from factuality by Post-Enlightenment secular
  observers.  Nightingale observes the exact same situation when a secular
  westerner attempts to gain insight from the worldview of Ancient Greece. She
  explains that:

  \begin{displayquote}
    `Th[e] combination of mysticism and rationality has created enormous
    scholarly problems. Most interpreters have ``solved'' this problem by
    separating the disparate fragments of Empedocles into two very different
    works: \textit{On Nature}, a ``natural-ist'' poem, and
    \textit{Purifications}, a supernatural story of reincarnation. Recently,
    however, several scholars have shown that some of the material ascribed to
    the latter poem belong in the former; as they suggest, the separation of the
    naturalist from the mythical material is based on the anachronistic
    assumption that true philosophy has no room for the supernatural. [\ldots]
    The fact that Empedocles wrote poems (or perhaps a single poem) which
    included ``philosophical'' and ``nonphilosophical'' (i.e.\ religious)
    material challenges the standard modern approach to the early thinkers.
    Among other things, it exposes our tendency to retroject contemporary
    conceptions of philosophy onto the ancients. If we resist this move, we can
    see that many of the early thinkers were engaged in complex and
    broad-ranging projects that do not fall neatly within the boundaries of
    philosophy as we now conceive it'
    \autocite[31]{Nightingale:2004}.
  \end{displayquote}
  Rationality is indeed a victim of epistemology. The essential necessity to
  separate myth from factuality could be indeed a unique feature of secular
  western epistemology. The `death of God' in Nietzschean terms was enacted by
  the West, and the abolition of metaphysical realities from rhetorical
  discourse makes it difficult for the rational observer to understand
  metaphysical world views \autocite[302]{Latre:2001}. A hermeneutical approach
  which takes into account emblematic and mythical portrayals of metaphysical
  polities is therefore crucial for gaining some insight from currently existing
  cosmological paradigms in South East Asia. It needs to be fully acknowledged
  that a methodology that explores the dimensions of interactive symbols of the
  body merely reflect one layer of reality, but is nevertheless, a shared one
  which is continually regenerated in the non-linear dimensions of social
  thought and action. Endorsing a historical linear approach would end up
  dislocating the mythical and factual, and such analysis will be bound by
  endless cycles of incongruities. Since the line between social reality and the
  way it is conceived is arguably a thin one indeed, it would be much more
  sensical to focus on the local history and hence interpreting Southeast Asian
  or Theravada Buddhist history as mythical paradigms, which to a certain
  extent, produce particular epistemological constructs. This would in turn
  strengthen Houtman's sensical argument that sacred biographies generate not
  stories but histories, which inevitably become ingrained in the collective
  minds of a locality \autocite[335]{Houtman:1997}. Understanding what in fact
  generates these epistemologies will end up refining ones understanding of the
  dynamics between state and \textit{sangha} in Theravada Buddhist Polities and
  could strengthen our analysis of the cultural significance of meditative
  practice and embodiment in contemporary Southeast Asia.

  \section{Conclusion}

  The interconnections between themes, texts, bodies, and realities are indeed
  outstanding when one acknowledges that they are purely bound by
  interpretation.  It is also surprising that it is the accumulation of distinct
  points of views, at times incompatible, that serve as the backbone for one's
  claims of conclusive analysis. This may imply that the myriad voices that
  bound one's mind may at some point in time harmonize yet it is difficult to
  know for how long such harmony may be kept intact. In order to kick start our
  analytical endeavors, we have shown that different people with different
  bodies do not have the same conception of the individual. For Dumont and
  Heesterman, the individual escapes the confinements of holistic paradigms and
  chooses to escape intersubjectivity while for Flood individuality should not
  be applied beyond post-Enlightenment epistemological frameworks. Yet once
  individuality is associated with liberation and empowerment through symbolic
  embodiment, the semantic scope of the term becomes more coherent. We have also
  observed that an agent who is able to embody particular truths (either through
  external or internal ritualization) has a particular position in the social
  matrix whether it is a king/state, a Buddhist monk/Brahmin Householder, or a
  wandering ascetic. Each type of embodiment generates symbols that may be
  translated into individual participation in a multi-vocal environment. Equally
  important for our analysis, is the discussion of how the categories invented
  by Indologists and social anthropologists bore the fruits of methodological
  incongruity. When one attempts to invent concrete distinctions between
  Theravada Buddhism and Hinduism, for instance, one ends up being blind to the
  socio-political relevance of the highly sophisticated techniques of embodiment
  (either through ritualization, meditation or asceticism) shared in both
  contexts. What is more, by positioning the Brahman householder and Buddhist
  meditator in a completely different position in the metaphysical social
  matrix, one becomes perplexed by their shared functions in the royal courts.
  Furthermore, the application of the \textit{etic} term `Buddhism' instead of
  the \textit{emic \'s\=asana} may result in assuming historical discontinuities
  in Burmese politics while it might not be the case in reality at all. More
  significantly, by neglecting the importance of symbolic embodiments which are
  unique to the studied localities, one may wrongly invent a symbolic voice of
  the laity (which is inexistent in the overall social matrix) and incorporate
  it into the overall analysis of socio-political theory. We have seen that
  although the laity is able to embody either the paradigm of the monastics
  through \textit{vipassan\=a} or the ascetics through \textit{samatha}, they do
  not have an independent voice in the metaphysical paradigm of the Burmese
  state. Finally we have stressed that in order to attain insight into a
  distinct worldview, we might have to abandon a clearcut separation between
  pure rationality and mythical paradigms. A more inclusive approach to
  Southeast Asian history from a phenomenological perspective is required, for
  without a richer and more profound understanding of the dynamics of body
  symbolism in Southeast Asia the epistemological constructs of such localities
  seem rather incomplete.

  \printbibliography[title=Bibliography, heading=bibintoc]

  % \vfill
  % \begin{center}
  %   \fontfamily{lmss}\selectfont
  %   \huge \color{lightgray}{Pela\hspace{1.61803pt}\textbf{::}Verse}
  % \end{center}
\end{document}

