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Books : reviews

Ian Hacking.
Logic of Statistical Inference.
CUP. 1965

This book is a philosophical study of the basic principles of statistical reasoning. Professor Hacking has sought to discover the simple principles which underlie modern work in mathematical statistics and to test them, both at a philosophical level and in terms of their practical consequences for statisticians. The ideas of modern logic are used to analyse these principles, and results are presented without the use of unfamiliar symbolism.

It begins with a philosophical analysis of a few central concepts and then, using an elementary system of logic, develops most of the standard statistical theory. The analysis provides answers to many disputed questions about how to test statistical hypotheses and about how to estimate quantities in the light of statistical data. One product of the analysis is a sound and consistent rationale for R. A. Fisher’s controversial concept of ‘fiducial probability’.

Ian Hacking.
Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?.
CUP. 1975

Many people find themselves dissatisfied with recent linguistic philosophy, and yet know that language has always mattered deeply to philosophy and must in some sense continue to do so. Ian Hacking considers here some dozen case studies in the history of philosophy to show the different ways in which language has been important, and the consequences for the development of the subject. There are chapters on, among others, Hobbes, Berkeley, Russell, Ayer, Wittgenstein, Chomsky, Feyerabend and Davidson. Dr. Hacking ends by speculating about the directions in which philosophy and the study of language seem likely to go.

The book will provide students with a stimulating, broad survey of problems in the theory of meaning and the development of philosophy, particularly in this century. The topics treated in the philosophy of language are among the central, current concerns of philosophers, and the historical framework makes it possible to introduce concretely and intelligibly all the main theoretical issues.

Ian Hacking.
Scientific Revolutions.
OUP. 1981

Ian Hacking.
Representing and Intervening.
CUP. 1983

This is a lively and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of natural science, organized around the central theme of scientific realism. It has two parts. Representing deals with the different philosophical accounts of scientific objectivity and the reality of scientific entities. The views of Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Putmam, van Fraassen, and others, are all considered. Intervening presents the first sustained treatment of experimental science for many years and uses it to give a new direction to debates about realism. Hacking illustrates how experimentation often has a life independent of theory. He argues that although the philosophical problems of scientific realism can not be resolved when put in terms of theory alone, a sound philosophy of experiment provides compelling grounds for a realistic attitude.

A great many scientific examples are described in both parts of the book, which also includes lucid expositions of recent high energy physics and a remarkable chapter on the microscope in cell biology.

Ian Hacking.
Why is there Philosophy of Mathematics at all?.
CUP. 2014

This truly philosophical book takes us back to fundamentals – the sheer experience of proof, and the enigmatic relation of mathematics to nature. It asks unexpected questions, such as ‘What makes mathematics mathematics?’, ‘Where did proof come from and how did it evolve?’, and ‘How did the distinction between pure and applied mathematics come into being?’ In a wide-ranging discussion that is both immersed in the past and unusually attuned to the competing philosophical ideas of contemporary mathematicians, it shows that proof and other forms of mathematical exploration continue to be living, evolving practices – responsive to new technologies, yet embedded in permanent (and astonishing) facts about human beings. It distinguishes several distinct types of application of mathematics, and shows how each leads to a different philosophical conundrum. Here is a remarkable body of new philosophical thinking about proofs, applications, and other mathematical activities.